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I. INTRODUCTION: FRENCH OVERTONES AND WESTERN RESPONSES
In 2004, the French legislature passed a law prohibiting the wearing of most
religious affiliated symbols, clothing, and garb in public schools.' Often called
the "Headscarf Ban," the law, formulated through a special commission of
politicians and scholars, is thought to be a direct attack on the growing French
Muslim population.2 Prohibited dress includes: headscarves (hij abs), turbans,
skullcaps (yarmulkes), and large crosses; thus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, and
Christians are affected.3 French President Jacques Chirac characterized the
law as necessary to maintain the religiously neutral nature of French schools
and the tenet of secularism (laicit6), or strict separation of church and state.4
' Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran~aise
[J.O.][Official Gazette of France], March 17, 2004, p. 5190; Derek H. Davis, Reacting to
France's Ban: Headscarves and Other Religious Attire in American Public Schools, 46 J.
CHURCH & STATE 221, 221 (2004); JUSTIN VAISSE, THE BROOKINGS INST., VEILED MEANING:
THE FRENCH LAW BANNING RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1 (2004), http://www.
brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/vaisse20040229.pdf. The law states that" '[in] public schools,
the wearing of symbols or clothing by which students conspicuously [ostensiblement] manifest
a religious appearance is forbidden.'" Elisa T. Belier, The HeadscarfAffair: The ConseilD 'Etat
on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 581, 581 (2004).
Davis's 2004 editorial highlighting the potential irony in America's reaction to the French
headscarf ban through a consideration of U.S. free exercise jurisprudence has been instrumental
in developing this Note.
2 Timur Yuskaev & Matt Weiner, Ban the Croissant!: Secular and Religious Rights, INT'L
HERALDTRIB., Dec. 19,2003, available athttp://www.iht.conarticles/2003/l 2/19/edtimured3
_.php; see also Davis, supra note 1, at 221 (stating "the unstated but clear aim of the law, if the
French media is any guide, is to prohibit female Muslim students from wearing the hijab...").
' U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 53 (2004), available at http://www.uscirf.
gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2004annualRpt.pdf; Stefanie Walterick, Comment, The
Prohibition ofMuslim Headscarvesfrom French Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding
the Hijab in the Western World, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251, 251 (2006); Davis, supra
note 1, at 221. See also Belier, supra note 1, at 582 (describing the composition of the
commission charged with examining the issue of secularism).
4 Press Release, U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, France: Proposed Bill May
Violate Freedom of Religion (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/mediaroom/
press/2004/february/02032004_france.html; Walterick, supra note 3, at 252; R. MURRAY
THOMAS, RELIGION IN SCHOOLS: CONTROVERSIES AROUND THE WORLD 30-31 (2006) (stating
that purpose of la'fcit6 is to ensure citizen loyalty to the state and the principles of freedom and
neutrality). But see VAISSE, supra note 1, at 2 (noting the principle of la'cit6 promotes religious
neutrality rather than secularism). See also Madeleine Sinclair, Note, Freedom of Religion in
Canada andFrance: Implications for Citizenship and Judgment, 15 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD.
39, 43 (2006) (Can.).
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A majority of the French population favors the law but the reaction around
the world is mixed.5 The French headscarf controversy, or 1 'affaire dufoulard,
seemed to highlight headscarf bans in other countries including Singapore and
Turkey.6 On the other hand, the United States has been particularly critical of
the law. In 2003, the New York Times reported on the Bush Administration's
disapproval of the proposal in light of the principles of religious freedom.7
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended the
French government reassess the regulations in light of international human
rights, chiefly, the specifications of the European Convention on Human
Rights.8
While the United States' reaction has primarily taken the form of citizen
protests and criticism from the government, Canada'sjudicial response "stands
out as a strong statement in favour of minority religious freedom."9 In light of
l'affaire dufoulard, the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) "sent a strong
message that Canada's public education institutions must embrace diversity
and develop an educational culture respectful of the right to freedom of
' VAISSE, supra note 1, at 4-5 (noting 69% of the French population supported the law,
particularly teachers and school officials'); Walterick, supra note 3, at 251 (discussing
worldwide reaction to the law). See LAURABARNETT, PARLIAMENTARY INFO. RESEARCH SERV.,
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 26 (2006) (Can.),
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb044 1-e.pdf.
6 Headscarves in the Headlines, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/europe/3476163.stm. See also BARNETT, supra note 5, at 25. Barnett reports that the
l'affaire dufoulard began in 1989, spurred on by three Muslim students who were suspended
for wearing hijabs in violation of their French school's rule prohibiting overt expressions of
religious beliefs. Id. at 28-33. Debates about the hijab have taken place in Austria, Spain, and
Malaysia. Davis, supra note 1, at 222.
' Christopher Marquis, U.S. Chides France on Effort to Bar Religious Garb in Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,2003, at A8; see also Claire Guimbert & Mary Ann Zehr, Chirac Proposal
on Religious Garb Stirs Debate, EDUC. WK., Jan. 7, 2004, at 9 (observing a top Bush
administrator's comments suggesting" '[a] fundamental principle of religious freedom that we
work for in many countries of the world, including on this very issue of head scarves, is that all
persons would be able to practice their religion and their beliefs peacefully, without government
interference, as long as they are doing so without provocation and intimidation of others in
society' "). See also Avi Schick, French Dressing: Lessons for America from the Proposed
French Ban on Religious Garb, SLATE, Dec. 30, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2093315/
(showing discomfort with the U.S. government's critique of the French given the prevalence of
religious-based employment discrimination in the United States).
8 Press Release, U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, supra note 4; ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 3, at 53-54.
9 Gerald L. Gall, Multiculturalism and the Charter, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS (Can.), Mar.
30, 2006, at 10; Delfin Vigil, Worldwide Protests Over Ban on Religious Symbols French
Proposal would apply to all its Public Schools, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 2004, at A22.
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religion."1° In Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, the
S.C.C. held that an orthodox Sikh student could wear a kirpan, a ceremonial
dagger, to school given his strong religious beliefs. 1 The S.C.C. used Multani
to restate the importance of freedom of religion even though a lower court
addressed a similar issue in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Peel Board
of Education.12
The U.S. Supreme Court has not had such opportunity to address student
religious garb issues directly. 3 Cheema v. Thompson is the only U.S. case
directly involving student kirpan wearing. 4 Cheema was decided under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a law later partially
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court on federalism grounds in City of
Boerne v. Flores.15
10 Terrance S. Carter & Anne-Marie Langan, Supreme Court Gives Strong Endorsement to
Freedom of Religion, CHURCH LAW BULLETIN No. 17 (Carters Prof I Corp., Orangeville,
Ontario, Can.), Mar. 16, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.carters.ca/pub/bulletin/church/200
6/chchlb 17.pdf.
"1 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
Canada had its own headscarf controversy in 1994 when a Muslim student was sent home from
her Montreal school for wearing a hijab in violation of the school's dress code prohibiting
clothing or accessories that would marginalize a student. While no legal action was filed and
the student enrolled in another school, the incident did create a great deal of discussion in
Quebec. One argument advanced in favor of banning the hijab arguably stemmed from the
French headscarf controversy and the prohibition on the use of the public school as a forum for
displaying religious beliefs. See Shauna Van Praagh, The Education of Religious Children:
Families, Communities and Constitutions, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 1343, 1379 (1999); Paul Clarke,
Religion, Public Education and the Charter: Where Do We Go Now?, 40 McGILL J. EDUC. 351,
371 (2005) (Can.).
12 Ontario Human Rights Comm. v. Peel Bd. of Educ., [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th) 475, 476
(Can.).
13 Davis, supra note 1, at 228 (noting that "there are no U.S. Supreme Court cases that deal
with the headscarf issue").
14 Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
"s City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See Amarjeet S. Bhachu, Note, A Shield
for Swords, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 209-10 (1996); Dipanwita Deb, Note, Of Kirpans,
Schools, and the Free Exercise Clause: Cheema v. Thompson Cuts Through RFRA 's
Inadequacies, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 877,879 (1996); Douglas Laycock, Religious Freedom
and International Human Rights in the United States Today, 12 EMORY INT'LL. REV. 951, 968
(1998); Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The
Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2209, 2213 (2005) (observing after Flores, "parents like Ms. Cheema could no longer bring a
free exercise challenge coupled with a RFRA challenge against a school board"); see also MARCI
A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 117 (2005).
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This Note will evaluate religious garb cases in light of l'affaire dufoulard,
focusing primarily on Multani and the Canadian treatment of religious garb
issues. Consideration of Multani is needed given the minimal consideration
of religious garb issues in the U.S. Supreme Court and federal courts. This
silence may have led to many American commentators and scholars' attack on
the United States for its own treatment of garb-related religious freedom issues
in public schools. 6
Part II of this Note will discuss the treatment of school kirpan wearing in
Canada, focusing on the recent Multani decision. Part III of this Note will
discuss the treatment of kirpan and religious garb in U.S. public schools
through a consideration of Cheema. Part IV of this Note makes a case for why
the United States should learn from Multani, considering the state of religious
freedom issues in the school context. Part V provides an analysis of lessons
to be learned from Multani by highlighting key aspects of the case and
Canadian responses. Finally, Part VI addresses how the United States can use
Multani to reiterate its commitment to religious accommodation.
II. TREATMENT OF KIRPANS IN CANADIAN SCHOOLS
The Canadian courts have addressed the issue of kirpan wearing in a
number of lower court cases. 7 In 1985, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
considered kirpans in school settings in Tuli v. St. Albert Protestant Separate
School District No. 6.I" There, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the
school board's policy that would have suspended or expelled him for wearing
his kirpan to school.19 In a short decision, the court authorized the kirpan if
blunted and held tightly within its sheath while on school property.2" The
court found that allowing the kirpan would "provide those who are unfamiliar
with the tenet of his faith an opportunity to be introduced to and to develop an
understanding of another's culture and heritage."21
6 Davis, supra note 1, at 222 (suggesting that "Americans, in thinking and talking about the
new French law, usually are quick to point out the superiority of American law, assuming that
the wearing of headscarves by Muslims in the nations' public schools is protected activity").
7 Hothi v. R., [1985] 3 W.W.R. 256 (Can.), represents a prominent case outside of the
school context. In that case, the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench upheld a provincial judge's
decision to bar a Sikh defendant from wearing a kirpan in the courtroom during his trial. See id.
11.
"S Tuli v. St. Albert Protestant Separate Sch. Dist. No. 6, [1985] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3906 (Can.).
'9 Tuli, [1985] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3906, 1; BARNETT, supra note 5, at 12.
20 Tuli, [1985] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3906, 9 7-8; BARNETT, supra note 5, at 12.
2 Tuli, [1985] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3906, 4.
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The court in Peel Board of Education found a total ban on the wearing of
kirpans problematic due to a lack of evidence suggesting kirpan wear in
schools posed a danger.22 The Peel Board of Education had adopted a no-
weapons policy and considered the kirpan a dangerous weapon rather than a
religious symbol.2 3 The Board was unable to reach an acceptable compromise
with affected members of the Sikh community such as wearing a replica or
stitching the kirpan into its sheath to prevent its removal.24 In its decision, the
court considered that there were no reported incidents of school violence
associated with kirpans.25 Upon consideration of the Ontario Human Rights
Code, 1981, the court rejected a prohibition on the wearing of kirpans in
schools by students and teachers. 26 Students and teachers were permitted to
wear kirpans only if they were "of reasonable size, worn under the wearer's
clothing and not visible, and... sufficiently secured so that removal would be
rendered difficult., 27 The Ontario Court of Appeal declined review.28 The
issue of kirpan in schools did not arise again in the courts until Multani
reached the S.C.C. almost fifteen years later.29
In Multani, the S.C.C. unanimously agreed to set aside a court of appeal
decision upholding a school board Council of Commissioners' prohibition on
a student's kirpan wear.3" The issue began in late 2001 when Gurbaj Singh
22 Ontario Human Rights Comm. v. Peel Bd. of Educ., [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th) 475, at 479.
See also Bhachu, supra note 15, at 221-22.
23 Peel Bd. of Educ., [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th) 475, at 476.
24 Id. at 476-77.
25 At the time there had been incidents of violence associated with kirpans outside of the
school setting including two stabbings. Id. at 477. See also HAMILTON, supra note 15, at 115
(citing a number of kirpan-related violent acts in Canada). One school related incident involved
a Sikh youth putting his hand on the handle of his kirpan before running away without drawing
it upon being assaulted on his walk home from school. Peel Bd of Educ., [1991] 80 D.L.R.
(4th) 475, at 477. The court considered that Sikh students were permitted to wear kirpans in
British Columbia and in other school districts. Id.
26 PeelBd. of Educ., [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th) 475, at 480.
27 Further, the Board ordered that principals maintain the right to ensure compliance with
conditions, modify the requirements, and impose reasonable temporary restrictions as needed.
Id. at 478-79.
21 William J. Smith, Private Beliefs and Public Safety: The Supreme Court Strikes Down a
Total Ban on the Kirpan in Schools as Unreasonable, 16 EDUC. & L.J. 83, 83 (2006) (Can.).
29 Id.
" Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.);
Canada Allows Sikh Students to Carry Daggers, CHURCH & STATE, Apr. 1, 2006, at 21,
available at http://www.av.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id8087&abbr--cs.
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Multani's kirpan fell from his clothing when playing on a playground at tcole
Sainte-Catherine-Labour6, a French language school in Montreal. 3
Gurbaj and his father, Balvir Singh Multani, who brought the lawsuit, are
orthodox Khalsa Sikhs.32 Sikhism, defined as" 'the fatherhood of God and the
brotherhood of man,' " is a monotheistic religion founded in India 500 years
ago with nearly 23 million followers worldwide.33 Baptized Sikhs, like the
Multanis, believe in five symbols of faith (the Five K's) including a comb
(kangha), a pair of britches (kachha), a bracelet (karha), a head turban to cover
uncut hair (keski), and a sword (kirpan).34 Sikhs view the kirpan as a religious
symbol to be worn at all times rather than a weapon.35
After the school's principal forbade Gurbaj from wearing the kirpan, the
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys's (school board) legal counsel
sent the Multanis a December 2001 letter authorizing Gurbaj to wear his kirpan
provided it was sealed in a sheath inside of his clothing.3 6 The Multani family
agreed to the conditions set forth in the counsel's letter.3 7 In February 2002,
the school's governing board overruled the December resolution, finding that
wearing a kirpan on school property would violate the school code of
conduct's prohibition on weapons.38 After the February decision, which
instructed students to wear symbolic pendants or plastic kirpans instead,
Gurbaj's father sought ajudgment declaring Gurbaj's right to wear his kirpan
in school if properly sealed in his clothing.39 Qudbec's Attorney General
31 Stuart Laidlaw, Accommodating Religions Challenges Secular Society; Supreme Court
Shows Leadership with Recent Ruling Urges Schools to Teach About Their Students 'Religions,
TORONTO STAR (Can.), Mar. 11,2006, at L09; William J. Smith, Balancing Security and Human
Rights: Quebec Schools Between Past and Future, 14 EDUc. & L.J. 99, 111 (2004) (Can.);
Timeline: The Quebec Kirpan Case, CBC NEWS, Mar. 2,2006 (Can.), available at http://www.
cbc.ca/news/background/kirpan/; BARRY W. BUSSEY, CHRISTIAN LEGALFELLOWSHIP, ANALYSIS
OF SCC KiRPAN DECISION: MULTANI V. COMMISSION SCOLAIRE MARGUERITE-BOURGEOYS 2006
SCC 6, at 1 (2006), http://www.christianlegal fellowship.org/Articles/SCC%20Case.pdf.
32 Smith, supra note 31, at 111; Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2.
31 W.H. MCLEOD, WHO IS A SIKH?: THE PROBLEM OF SIKH IDENTITY 1 (2d ed. 2002); Brief
of Appellants at 1, Cheema v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-16097), 1994
WL 16123892; GURINDER SINGH MANN, SIKHISM 14 (2004). The 2001 Census data reflects that
0.9% of the Canadian population is Sikh. Clarke, supra note 11, at 362. About I million Sikhs
reside in Canada and nearly 500,000 in the United States. Brief of Appellants, supra, at 6.
3 MANN, supra note 33, at 61-62; MCLEOD, supra note 33, at 32.
3' Timeline: The Quebec Kirpan Case, supra note 31.
36 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 3; BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 1.
3 BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 1.
38 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 4; Smith, supra note 31, at 111-12.
39 BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 1-2; Timeline: The Quebec Kirpan Case, supra note 31.
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intervened, issuing a statement emphasizing a zero-tolerance policy for
"knives" in school, including kirpans.4"
The superior court authorized the student to wear his kirpan to school if he
complied with a number of conditions.4 The Qudbec Court of Appeal
dismissed the motion for a declaratory judgment in March 2004.42 Multani
appealed that court's decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.43
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed two key issues relevant to this
Note: first, whether the school board's decision to prohibit Gurbaj from
wearing his kirpan at school constituted an infringement of the student's rights
under the Quebec Charter or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
and second, whether such an infringement was justifiable under an exception
in the Quebec Charter." The court held that the school board's decision
40 Smith, supra note 28, at 93. Smith's analysis suggests the Attorney General's comments
might have stemmed from broader public safety concerns such as 9/11 and terrorism. Smith,
supra note 31, at 126-27.
4' The conditions would require a student to wear his kirpan under his clothing at all times
and to carry it in a wooden, rather than metal sheath. The sheathed kirpan was to be wrapped
in a cloth envelope and sewn into the student's undergarments. School officials would be
authorized to reasonably ensure that conditions were followed and the disappearance of the
kirpan was to be immediately reported to school officials. If the specifications were not
followed, the student would lose the right to wear the kirpan in school. See Multani, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 8; Carter & Langan, supra note 10, at 2. The factum (brief) submitted by the Canadian
Human Commission as an intervener listed a few other restrictions as accommodations, provided
they complied with the Sikh religion, including using an alarm or similar device to detect if the
kirpan was removed from its scabbard and organizing information sessions to promote student
awareness about the kirpan and student safety measures. Factum of Intervener Canadian Human
Rights Commission at 16, Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (No. 30322), available at http://www.
chrc-ccdp.ca/pdf/FactumMultani-en.pdf.
42 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 12; Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, [2004] 241 D.L.R. (4th) 336 72 & 100 (Can.) (recognizing that even fundamental
freedoms are not absolutely protected and recognizing a safety threat imposed by the presence
of kirpans in schools).
41 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 7.
4 Id. 13; Smith, supra note 31, at 115. An additional issue involved determining the
proper standard ofreview for reviewing the school board's decision in an administrative context.
See Smith, supra note 28, at 93-94. The majority of the court agreed to apply the stringent
standard of review used in constitutional law cases, but two minority opinions argued for an
administrative law standard. See Smith, supra note 28, at 95-96. The Charter of Rights and
Freedoms forms Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982. See BARNETT, supra note 5, at 5 & n.13.
Canada's Constitution is comprised of a number of sources, including portions of Great Britain's
common law. See Pauline C6t6 & T. Jeremy Gunn, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations
on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in Canada, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 685, 691 (2005).
Canada did not have a document expressly guaranteeing fundamental rights until 1982. Id. at
694-95.
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constituted an infringement on the student's freedom of religion under § 2(a)
of the Charter.45 While the court acknowledged internal limits in § 2(a) which
could thwart a person's freedom to practice religious beliefs on the basis of
public safety, the court declined to find such limitations applicable in Gurbaj's
case.
46
Additionally, the S.C.C., like the Court of Appeal, considered the validity
of the school's interest in banning kirpans in the interest of school safety under
the test established in R. v. Oakes.47 However, the S.C.C. came to a different
conclusion, focusing more on accommodation and finding a lack of evidence
to support a total ban on kirpan wearing.48
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted "a total prohibition against
wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of this religious symbol and
sends students the message that some religious practices do not merit the same
protection as others." '49 The court noted that while valid safety concerns were
raised, banning all potential weapons in schools was not feasible because
pencils and baseball bats might serve as weapons as well.5 While the Court
of Appeal made little mention of Peel Board of Education, the S.C.C. found
the decision persuasive and distinguished the school context from that of
courtrooms and airplanes where kirpans have been banned.5 The court
considered that schools are places for engagement in the "enterprise of
41 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 33; BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 2. A more in-depth
treatment of § 2(a) follows.
4 Smith, supra note 28, at 96-97; Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 26.
4 Smith, supra note 28, at 100-01. In R. v. Oakes, the S.C.C. set out the criteria used to
evaluate restrictions on rights under the Charter. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). To qualify as a
constitutional infringement of a Charter right, the government imposition must stem from an
important objective, be rationally connected to an important objective, minimize impairment on
an individual's rights, and embody proportionality between the objective sought and the
imposition on the individual. Id.; Luan-Vu N. Tran, The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: Justification, Methods, andLimits ofa Multicultural Interpretation, 28 COLuM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 33, 58-59 (1996).
48 Smith, supra note 28, at 104. The minority opinion expresses concern with applying
accommodation doctrines to public concerns. See id at 102. Because the court found a total ban
unreasonable, it did not have to consider the proportionality prong of the Oakes test. Id. at 105.
" Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 79.
50 Id. 58; Bryce Chandler, Freedom of Religion: The Supreme Court and the Kirpan,
EDUC. CAN., Summer 2006, at 33.
11 Smith, supra note 28, at 104. Paul Horwitz, The Sources and Limits of Freedom of
Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond, 54 U. TORONTO FAC. L.
REv. 1, 34-35 (1996) (Can.). Interestingly, individuals involved in the Multani case were
allowed to wear their kirpans before the Supreme Court during hearings. BARNETT, supra
note 5, at 13.
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education in which both teachers and students are partners."52 Finally, the
court also noted that it was not wholly relevant to the analysis that other Sikhs
might agree to wear a plastic or wooden kirpan if Gurbaj maintained a sincere
personal belief regarding his own need to wear a kirpan.53 In sum, the decision
highlights the importance of promoting the values of multiculturalism,
diversity, and respect for others. 4
Like the United States, Canada widely recognizes the importance of
freedom of religion, thus, the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
remains a core document protecting individual liberties and expression.55 The
Charter serves to ensure human dignity without imposing a standardized
national ideology.56 Thus, under § 1, freedoms and rights articulated in the
Charter are guaranteed "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."57 A
number of provisions are relevant when considering religious freedoms
generally. Firstly, § 2 of the Charter characterizes freedom of conscience and
religion as a fundamental freedom held by "[e]veryone." 58 Secondly, § 15
52 Smith, supra note 28, at 104.
53 BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 3. See also Avigail Eisenberg, Reasoning about Identity:
Canada's Distinctive Culture Test, in DIVERSITY AND EQUALITY: THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK
OF FREEDOM IN CANADA 34, 45 (Avigail Eisenberg ed., 2006) (noting that courts often hear
evidence about how religious practices can be modified); Multani, (2006) 1 S.C.R. 256, 39
(recognizing lower court's acknowledgment that people with the same religion can vary in their
adherence to religious practices).
54 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 78.
55 See Bhachu, supra note 15, at 218; see also Mark Noll, Continental Divides: North
American Civil War and Religion as at Least Three Stories, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE IN
CANADA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 153, 153 (Marguerite Van Die ed.,
2001) (noticing the Charter begins with an invocation of the supremacy of God in direct contrast
to the U.S. Constitution of 1789 which makes little mention of religion); Horwitz, supra note 51,
at 3 (acknowledging that the preamble to the Canadian Charter serves as a reminder that "a
citizen may have two sources of obligation"); see also Tran, supra note 47, at 35 (calling the
Charter a "promising document capable of mediating opposing values and interests"). See also
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Mariah Zeisberg, Religious Freedom in Canada and the United
States, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 244, 266 (2006).
56 Tran, supra note 47, at 50, 54.
" Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), § 1. Thus, § 1 is commonly called the
"Limitation Clause" because a right granted by the Charter cannot be absolute since personal
rights are often in conflict with one another. See Tran, supra note 47, at 57. By contrast, the
U.S. Free Exercise Clause is expressed in absolute terms. See Eisgruber & Zeisberg, supra note
55, at 260.
" Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). Tran notes a distinction between conceptions
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requires that every individual be treated equally by and under the law "without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, [or]
religion . . . ."" Finally, § 27 calls for an interpretation of the Charter in a
manner that preserves and enhances the "multicultural heritage of
Canadians. 6 °
According to one scholar, religious freedom in Canada is comprised of the
interrelated concepts of liberalism, secularism, and religious conscience. 6' The
courts are left to protect individual rights and civic values by striking the
balance between these concepts.62 Canadian courts' treatment of religious
freedom cases often begins with R. v. Big MDrug Mart.6a Big MDrug Mart
acknowledges that "in certain contexts minority communities suffer
of "fundamental rights" in the U.S. Constitution and the Charter. For instance, § 2 of the Charter
refers only to the expressly granted freedoms of religion, expression, press, and association,
whereas the United States conception of fundamental freedoms is based on a larger collection
of rights having either an express or implied basis in the U.S. Constitution. Tran, supra note 47,
at 42-43. On the other hand, in France, freedom of religion is not fundamental, but rather,
rejection of religious belief is seen as fundamental. Scholars theorize that France's recent
acceptance of the weight of religious obligations may explain the country's difficulty in
accepting religious difference. See Alain Garay, Blandine Chelini-Pont, Emmanuel Tawil &
Zarah Anseur, The Permissible Scope ofLegal Limitations on the Freedom ofReligion or Belief
in France, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 785, 819 (2005).
" Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
60 Id. § 27; see Tran, supra note 47, at 56 & n.56 (listing brief sources interpreting § 27).
61 Benjamin Berger, The Limits of Belief" Freedom ofReligion, Secularism, and the Liberal
State, 17 CAN. J.L. & SOC'Y 39, 40 (2002) (Can). Berger refers to liberalism as a
conceptualization of reason and individualism. Id. at 42. Religious conscience concerns an
individual's "disposition towards life animated by religious conviction." Id. at 46. Secularism
involves the use of a societal tool "to confine the influence of religion on state power." Id. at
49. Berger notes the concept of secularism must be viewed in light of Canada's increasingly
pluralist state as evidenced by multiculturalism polices. Id. at 50.
62 Id. at 53.
63 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.); David M. Brown, Where Can
I Pray? Sacred Space in a Secular Land, 17 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 121, 124 (2005) (Can.). Big M
Drug Mart involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Lord's Day Act which prohibited
work and commercial activity on Sunday. Big MDrug Mart, [ 1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 1-5. Big
M Drug Mart defined freedom of religion as "the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and
dissemination. But the concept means more than that." Id. 94; see Brown, supra, at 124.
Other principal S.C.C. religious freedom cases under the Charter include Syndicat Northcrest
v. Amselem [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.), R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (Can.), and R. v.
Videoflicks Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.). For a brief overview of Syndicat and Jones see
Sinclair, supra note 4, at 60-62.
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considerable disadvantages, even threats to their existence, if they are treated
as identical to the majority group. '
Some Canadians have applied the Big M Drug Mart message to their
consideration of the kirpan issue: "We must guard against becoming a society
that cringes at kippas, turbans, and kirpans. Community leaders... must
speak forcefully for core values of democracy, freedom of speech, civic
responsibility, respect for others. Our schools must reinforce that message."65
However, not all Canadians agree with Multani or its implications.66 A 2006
comment in the Globe and Mail argued that the decision to allow students to
bring kirpans to school seemed illogical "in a country where little old ladies
cannot board an airplane with a small pair of manicure scissors. 67  A
commentary on Multani reported that 87% of 3,734 respondents to a La Presse
newspaper survey were opposed to the case.68 The Qudbec government, which
saw the original action, provided a guarded response reaffirming the school
board's power to take reasonable security measures while respecting students'
religious freedom. 69 However, in summary, scholars suggest Multani shows
the S.C.C.'s willingness to view religion outside of typical societal concepts
and to accommodate religious groups.70
Canadian school districts have faced other accommodation issues post-
Multani and have made further exceptions for religious students. For example,
4 Tran, supra note 47, at 62.
65 Canada's Mosaic Serves Nation Well, TORONTO STAR (Can.), June 10, 2006, at F06.
6' See Carter & Langan, supra note 10, at 10 (documenting that despite the court's
recognition of minority religious rights, the public reaction ranged from support to strong
opposition); BARNETT, supra note 5, at 1 1 (noting that despite some resistance from Qudbeckers,
the Multani decision reflects "the reality of compromise with respect to kirpans that already
exists in school boards across Canada"); Letter to the Editor, Theft in Schools Makes Sikh
Kirpans a Danger, TORONTO STAR (Can.), Mar. 5, 2006, at A16 (voicing Toronto resident's
hope that schools will take special precautions to protect against kirpan theft).
"' Lysiane Gagnon, Editorial, The Kirpan Decision Isn't Welcome in Quebec, GLOBE &
MAIL, Mar. 13, 2006, at A 15. Butsee Letter from Robert W. Ward, Secretary General, Canadian
Human Rights Commission to the Editor of the Globe & Mail (Mar. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.chrc-ccdp.calmediaroom/lettereditor-lettre/kirpan-en.asp (critiquing the column,
noting the importance of accommodation, and recognizing the unique nature of the school
context).
61 Smith, supra note 28, at 84. Smith includes a number of citizen comments to "illustrate
the high level of feeling that this ruling has generated in Quibec" and the wide range of reasons
behind the opposition. Id. at 84-85.
69 Id. at 84.
70 BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 5 (noting the court wisely declined to limit the conception of
religious freedom to anything less than what was articulated in Big M Drug Mart, thereby
preserving the recognition of religious freedoms pursuant to the Charter).
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in May 2006, the Commission Scolaire Marie-Victorin closed a high school
pool for a private swimming class for three Muslim students.7' Such measures
line up with general tenets of Canadian law allowing students to opt-out of
patriotic ceremonies that violate their religious beliefs.
72
Unlike education systems in the United States, Canadian schools are often
closely tied to religion, particularly to Roman Catholicism and Protestant
denominations. 73 Without an explicit "anti-establishment principle," religious
education in Canada is often publicly funded.74 In this respect, U.S. policy on
strictly separating the institutions of church and state appear at first glance to
have more in common with the French concept of lalcit6.75 However, both
Canada and the United States are considered immigrant countries and thus,
claim to be neutral and accommodating of religious freedom and expression
rather than adopting a more secular approach.76
1II. TREATMENT OF KIRPANS IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed kirpans in
schools in Cheema v. Thompson.77 The case is viewed as a victory for Sikh
" The students asked to be excused from regular swimming class because their religion
prohibited them from sharing a pool with men. See Sean Gordon, Muslim Girls Allowed Private
Swim Test; Religion Makes Ripples in Pool, Montreal-Area School Focus For Debate, TORONTO
STAR (Can.), May 11, 2006, at A06.
72 Ingvill Thorson Plesner, Legal Limitations to Freedom of Religion or Belief in School
Education, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 557, 578 (2005).
71 Smith, supra note 28, at 86. For an interesting argument for the termination of all public
funding for religious schools see Ailsa Watkinson, To Whom Do We Entrust Public Education?,
14 EDUC. & L.J. 191 (2004) (Can.).
7" Praagh, supra note 11, at 1362-63. For example, Roman Catholic schools in Ontario
receive public funds as a means of supporting the minority religious group within the province.
Id. at 1363-64. See also Richard Moon, Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 563, 563 (2003)
(arguing § 2(a) protects individuals from state coercion but does not preclude state endorsement
of religion).
" Eisgruber & Zeisberg, supra note 55, at 244. See also BARNETT, supra note 5, at 1
(noting France, unlike Canada and the United States, relies on the policy of la'cit6 to relegate
"overt forms of religious expression to the private sphere").
76 Praagh, supra note 11, at 1351-52; BARNETT, supra note 5, at 1.
" Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cit. 1995). Other U.S. cases considering kirpan
wear in non-school settings include New York v. Singh, 516 N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987)
and Ohio v. Singh, 690 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). In the latter case, the defendant, a
veterinarian, was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in an Ohio courtroom. The Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conviction and discharged Singh after finding no
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families, a demonstration of the power of religious symbols, and an illustration
of the potential for compromises between families and school districts."8 In
Cheema, the Livingston Union School District appealed a district court order
requiring it to accommodate three Khalsa Sikhs who sought to wear their
kirpans to a California school.79 The action was brought under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which states that a federal, state,
or local government was prohibited from interfering "with the 'free exercise'
of religion" absent proof of a " 'compelling governmental interest' " of the
"'least restrictive' "nature. 8° The students were found to be in violation of the
school district's "no weapons" policy and a California penal law prohibiting
the carrying knives in public places.8' Even after the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) became involved, the school board and superintendent refused
to reconsider their position suggesting that the Cheema children wear a
necklace replica as an alternative.8 2 An action seeking an injunction against
enforcement of the ban was subsequently filed in the district court in early
1994.83 The district court initially denied the injunction, but that decision was
overturned on appeal.8" On remand the district court found that the ban
violated RFRA and granted the injunction. 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the children presented
sufficient evidence of hardship. 6 Further, the court found no abuse of
evidence suggesting the kirpan was possessed as a weapon. Ohio v. Singh, 690 N.E.2d at
920-21. For a brief overview of the treatment of kirpans in other countries including India,
Canada, and the United Kingdom see Bhachu, supra note 15, at 212-22 (observing that the
United States can learn from other countries that a complete prohibition on kirpan wearing is not
necessary to promote public safety and order).
78 Alison Dundes Renteln, Visual Religious Symbols and the Law, 47 AM. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 1573, 1576 (2004).
79 Cheema, 67 F.3d at 884-85; Renteln, supra note 78, at 1576-77. The Cheema children
were baptized during the December school recess, returned to school wearing the Five K's, and
were suspended shortly thereafter. Brief of Appellants, supra note 33, at 2. Prior to their
baptism, the Cheema children took a training course which included advisement on the proper
treatment of the kirpan. Id. at 6-7.
80 Brief of Appellants, supra note 33, at 2.
8' Renteln, supra note 78, at 1577.
82 Brief of Appellants, supra note 33, at 7-8.
83 Id. at 9. The plaintiffs' evidence incorporated commentary on kirpans in Canadian
schools, including two court decisions from the Ontario and Alberta provinces and a 1990 report
submitted to the Calgary Board of Education finding no record of violence stemming from kirpan
wearing in schools. Id. at 10-11.
84 See Cheema v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1994).
5 Cheema, 64 F.3d at 885.
86 Id. at 885-86 (noting that under the RFRA, students had to show wearing a kirpan was
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discretion in the district court's creation of the terms of the injunction after the
parties failed to agree on a compromise themselves.8 7 The injunction's
conditions specified ideal limitations on the kirpan's length and required that
it be "sewn tightly to its sheath.""8 Further, the district court required that the
school district "take all reasonable steps to prevent any harassment,
intimidation or provocation of the Cheema children by any employee or
student in the District."8 9 Judge Cynthia Holcomb was clear to note the
majority was not rubber-stamping the injunction, but rather affirming the
district court's discretion to orchestrate the injunction's terms. 90
A stirring dissent by Circuit Judge Charles Wiggins highlights the other
side of the story, citing the importance of the school's compelling interest in
preserving a safe school environment. 9' Wiggins argued that the restrictions
imposed to address the school's legitimate safety concerns were insufficient,
particularly in view of testimony suggesting the Sikh students might use the
kirpans as weapons.92
a "sincere religious belief and that the school district's refusal to accommodate that belief put
a substantial burden on their exercise of religion").
87 Id. at 886. The Cheemas and the school district disagreed on the acceptable kirpan length
and the mechanism for fastening the kirpans to the students' sheaths. For example, the district
requested that kirpans be riveted to their sheaths, but the Cheemas only agreed to sewing the
kirpans to the sheaths. Id. at 888 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
" Conditions required the kirpan's blade be dulled, no more than 3.5 inches in length, and
the kirpan be no more than 7.5 inches including the sheath. The kirpan was to be worn on a
cloth strap under the student's clothing. Designated officials would be permitted to make
reasonable inspections to ensure compliance. Violations of conditions could lead to a loss of
privileges. See id. at 886.
89 Id. at 886.
90 Id.
9! Id. at 886-87 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Wiggins' dissent also notes that Sikhs are not
permitted to wear their kirpans in other environments including courtrooms and schools. See
also HAMILTON, supra note 15, at 116 (calling Wiggins' dissent "a far more rational analysis"
that considers the rights ofnon-Sikhs). Hamilton suggests ways Sikh families can maintain their
religious beliefs without posing a threat to school safety, such as sending children to religious
or home schools. Id. at 118. For a response to Hamilton's consideration of kirpans see Marc
0. DeGirolami, Recoiling from Religion, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 619, 640 (2006).
92 Cheema, 67 F.3d at 889 (Wiggins, J., dissenting); Thomas C. Berg,. State Religious
Freedom Sfitutes in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 531, 559 (1999).
Berg reasons that few U.S. districts would go further than the Cheema court in accommodating
kirpan wear in public schools.
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
IV. LEARNING FROM MULTANI
In light of the increasing diversity of religions, continued growth of
minority religions, and expanding school programs such as uniform policies,
Multani continues to be an important decision.93 At issue are the competing
interests of school districts in training students and of parents in directing the
upbringing of their children. 94 If schools' interests prevail, religious students
will have to violate their religious principles or forgo a free public school
education. 95
While some U.S. school districts such as the Davis School District in
Farmington, Utah, have addressed religious garb issues in their dress codes, it
seems unlikely that specific treatment will be given to kirpans.96 By contrast,
at least one Canadian school district has specific dress code policies to address
Sikh students wearing kirpans. 97 For example, the Delta School District of
British Columbia outlined and approved a policy for the wearing of kirpans as
early as 1987, noting that the kirpan was not to be considered an offensive
weapon if concealed and worn as a means of religious expression.9 8 However,
" See Lechliter, supra note 15, at 2210 (noting that cases like Cheema may become more
common because of changing school programs even though the volatility of Free Exercise case
law makes developing judicial standards difficult).
9 Berg, supra note 92, at 534.
9 Id.; see also Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256,
40 (Can.) (finding that Gurbaj had been deprived of the right to attend a public school because
he chose to follow his religious convictions).
96 The Davis School District Policy required schools to appropriate dress code exemptions
and reasonable accommodations for clothing, hairstyles, headwear, and other apparel serving as
sincere expressions of personal religious beliefs. Further, the policy outlined examples of
religious garb or attire warranting accommodations including but not limited to: hairstyles,
yarmulkes, head scarves or turbans, crucifixes, Stars of David, or items of ceremonial dress.
FARMINGTON, UTAH, DAVIS SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD POL'Y: 1 lIR-107 RELIGION AND
EDUCATION 4.1-4.3 (2000), available at http://www.davis.kl 2.ut.us/policy/manual/webdoc 11.
htm (emphasis added). More generally, the Salt Lake City (Utah) School District School Board
policies recognize that accommodations must be made for "students whose religious beliefs are
substantially affected by a dress code requirement" but do not specifically outline how
accommodations should be made. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
SCHOOLBOARDPOLICIES & PROCEDURES, JFCA-R, DRESS CODE R. 4.02.06.05 (2002), available
at http://www.slc.kl 2.ut.us/board/policies/students/JFCA-R.pdf.
97 BRITISH COLUMBIA, CANADA, DELTA SCHOOL DISTRICT PROCEDURE # 1131.2 CONDUCT:
WEARING OF KIRPAN BY MEMBERS OF SUCH RELIGION (Can.) (1992), available at http://web.
deltasd.bc.ca/i/pdfJPP 1100/Procedure 11312.pdf.
9' Id. In addressing safety concerns, the procedure warms against students wearing kirpans
or karpas (steel bracelets) as part of Physical Education classes or other activities involving large
numbers of students. Further, parents of students wearing such items are to be advised that the
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not all Canadian school districts are rushing to comply with Multani by
amending dress codes. The no-weapons policy of another British Columbia
school district still appears to bar kirpans.99
The treatment of a potential school kirpan case in the United States will
involve consideration of a number of key Supreme Court cases, including
Employment Division v. Smith, which represented the Court's move to a
narrower conception of the Free Exercise Clause.00 It is also important to
consider two school law cases, Tinker v. Des Moines and Wisconsin v.
Yoder.' In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Free Exercise
Clause did not inhibit Oregon's ability to deny unemployment benefits to
religious peyote-users dismissed fromjobs.'°2 In response to Smith, Congress
passed RFRA.'03 However, the Supreme Court determined that RFRA was an
unconstitutional "intrusion at every level of government" in City ofBoerne v.
Flores."° Thus, Smith still stands as a bar to an individual's ability to gain
exemptions from generally applicable state laws.'05
students may be excused from the Physical Education programs if a potential safety hazard
endangers the student wearer or others.
" Mikelle Saskamoose, School District 17 (Kamloops) Bans Kirpans, CLEARWATER TIMES
(Can.), Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.bcsikhyouth.com/2006/school-district- 1 7-kam
loops-bans-kirpans/. The chairman of the school district said the board would consider
accommodations if requested. Id.
'00 Davis, supra note 1, at 224; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
101 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
'02 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 890. In Smith, the Court rejected an application of the test set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which involved determining whether the state
action was a substantial burden on a religious exercise and then determining whether such an
imposition was justified by a compelling governmental interest. See City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997). Thus, in Smith, the Court held that "neutral, generally applicable laws
may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
interest." 494 U.S. at 879; Flores, 521 U.S. at 514.
103 Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
"o Id. at 532. Flores involved the denial of a church's building permit under the federal
RFRA. In response to Flores, a number of states have enacted RFRAs. See Berg, supra note 92,
at 532; Charles Haynes, Dress Codes vs. Religious Practice: What Kind of Nation Are We?,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Oct. 19, 2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org//commenta
ry.aspx?id= 1 2080&SearchString-dress code vs. religious practice.
' Rachael Toker, Tying the Hands of Congress: City of Boerne v. Flores, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 273, 273 (1998). For dialogue on RFRA as an unlawful extension of Congress's
§ 5 powerIunder the Fourteenth Amendment see Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1903 (2001).
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Both Tinker and Yoder offer potential arguments for students and families
seeking the right to wear religious garb in schools. In Tinker, the petitioner
students and parents sought injunctive relief after the students were suspended
from public schools for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
War. 0 6 In protecting the students' speech, the Court considered whether
wearing the armbands would constitute a substantial and material interference
with the operation of the school or an impingement on the rights of other
students. °7 The court noted that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.' 08 In Yoder, the Supreme Court recognized the right
of Amish parents to remove their children from compulsory schooling, giving
strong consideration to the unique nature of Amish life. 10 9 However, it is
unclear how far Yoder should apply outside of the context of the Amish
community."0
Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District offers a more recent
treatment of free exercise and religious expression issues."' There, the
plaintiffs alleged that the school district violated their First Amendment rights
to religious expression and freedom of speech through a district-wide ban on
"'gang related apparel.' "'"2 Shortly after the plaintiffs began wearing plastic
rosaries to school as a form of religious expression, the school identified
rosaries as gang apparel. "' The court dismissed the school district's argument
that wearing the rosary was not protected by the First Amendment since it was
not a requirement of Catholic religious practice. "' The court considered the
106 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
'07 Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
l0' Id. at 506. Like Yoder, the issue ofkirpan wearing would probably involve a "hybrid right
of speech and religion under Smith." Berg, supra note 92, at 557. In Smith, the Court
recognized that "[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved.., the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections ..
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
." Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French
Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1972).
1"0 Gey, supra note 109, at 43-44.
." Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
112 Id. at 663.
113 Id. at 663-64.
114 Id. at 670.
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claim as a hybrid under Smith and applied a heightened level of scrutiny to
conclude prohibiting rosaries violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights." 5
A number of other religious garb issues have arisen in recent years but have
not been fully litigated due to compromise. For example, a family practicing
Rastafarianism reached an agreement with a Louisiana school district which
allowed the students to enroll in the public schools after being turned away
because of the district's dress code which banned headgear and "extreme
hairstyles."" 6 The students' long dreadlocked hair and head coverings were
deemed a violation of the policy." 7 In 2000, American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) attorneys asked a federal court to review the school district's
policies."' A number of other incidents involving the wearing of a cross, Star
of David, and pentacle, have arisen in U.S. school districts." 9
... The court applied Yoderto conclude the school district's restriction on rosaries "does not
'bear more than a reasonable relation' to regulating gang activity in the District." Id. at 671.
116 Aarika Mack, Louisiana School District Relents, Allows Rastafarian Students'
Dreadlocks, Caps, FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2000, http://www.freedomforum.org/
templates/document.asp?documentID=3630.
117 Id.
118 Id.
19 In 1999, the American Center for Law and Justice sued an Alabama school district after
a student faced suspension for violating the dress code by failing to wear her cross necklace
underneath her shirt. Jeremy Learning, Alabama Student Allowed to Wear Cross in View for
Now, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Feb. 2, 2000, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/
document.asp?documentID=8847. A settlement was reached but the district's attorney maintains
that no precedent exists to govern conflicts between dress codes and student religious freedoms.
Jeremy Learning, Alabama School District Settles Dispute Over Cross Necklace, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, Mar. 1, 2000, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?
documentlD=l 1770. A Mississippi school board retracted a policy prohibiting students from
wearing gang-related symbols after the ACLU filed suit when a student was told to tuck his Star
of David necklace into his shirt. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Jewish Student
Allowed to Wear Star of David Pendant as Mississippi School Board Reverses Policy (Aug. 24,
1999), available at http://www.aclu.org/studentsrights/religion/12793prs19990824.html. In
2002, a Texas high school student was suspended for wearing a pentagram in violation of a
prohibition on jewelry, but was later allowed to return wearing the necklace. Texas School
Superintendent Allows Wiccan Student to Wear Pentacle, FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Sept. 12,
2002, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=16948. For an
interesting case involving a challenge to a school uniform policy brought by a Christian
grandparent see Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C.
1999); Jeremy Leaming, Public School Dress Code Challenged on Religious-Liberty Grounds,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Feb. 1, 1999, http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.
asp?documentlD=8553; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Student Prevails in NC
School Uniform Dispute (Jan. 1, 2000), available at http://www.aclu.org/studentsrights/dress
codes/12860prs20000111 .html.
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Additionally, at least two school kirpan incidents have arisen in the United
States in recent years. In 2005, a fifteen year-old Amritdhari Sikh was
suspended from Greenburgh Central School in New York for wearing a
kirpan. 120 The student, Amandeep Singh, and his family met with school
officials, and the parties agreed to allow Singh to return to school with his
kirpan if it was secured in a cloth pouch under his clothing. ' 21 In another case,
a Texas Sikh student "rejected her school's decision to allow her to wear her
kirpan only if it [was] welded shut to the sheath," but declined to press the
decision as she was selected to attend a prestigious academic program at
another institution. 22 These two cases suggest that the facts leading to
Cheema and Multani are not isolated events.
V. LESSONS: THE IMPACT OF MULTANI
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have "left individuals in the
United States acutely sensitive to anything that resembles a weapon."'' 23 Thus,
the kirpan, a religious symbol to Sikhs, looks like a threatening weapon "[t]o
the ordinary American unfamiliar with the Sikh religion."'24 That certain
120 Press Release, United Sikhs, United Sikhs Helps New York Sikh Student Regain Right
to Wear his Kirpan to School (Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.unitedsikhs.org/PressR
eleases/PRSRLS-16-03-2005-00.htm. Amritdharis have undergone a special ceremony and
follow Sikh practices in their entirety. MANN, supra note 33, at 118.
121 Letter from Josephine N. Moffett, Superintendent of Schools, Greenburgh Central School
District to Mr. and Mrs. Nirmal Singh (Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.unitedsikhs.org/
rtt/Letter from school.pdf. The Singhs also agreed to reasonable inspections. The school
district further agreed to expunge the student's record. Id.
12 Sikh Schoolgirl Rejects School's Decision to Weld Her Kirpan to the Sheath, UNITED
SIKHS: COMMUNITY VOICE (July 2, 2005), available at http://www.unitedsikhs.org/PressRelea
ses/COMVCE-02-07-2005-00.htm. The school's proposal might be problematic given that
Sikhs remove the kirpans from the sheaths during certain ceremonial events at Sikh temples. See
Deb, supra note 15, at 882.
123 Renteln, supra note 78, at 1579 (commenting that "[t]he impact of seeing a dagger in a
public school should not be underestimated, [in] an era of devastating school violence and
heightened awareness of terrorist attacks..."); Todd A. DeMitchell & Casey D. Cobb, Policy
Responses to Violence in Our Schools: An Exploration of Security as a Fundamental Value,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 459, 459-61 (2003). After September 11, Sikhs have increasingly
become victims of hate crimes and racial profiling because of their resemblance to Arabs and
Muslims. See Deborah Ramirez & Stephanie Woldenberg, Balancing Security and Liberty in
a Post-September 11th World: The Search for Common Sense in Domestic Counterterrorism
Policy, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 495, 496 (2005); Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt,
Walking While Muslim, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 243 (2005).
124 Renteln, supra note 78, at 1579. See also Smith, supra note 31, at 126 (discussing
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religious objects, practices, and beliefs are often misunderstood by mainstream
religious practitioners has not gone unnoticed in Canadian courts.' 25 One of
many important lessons of Multani is an acknowledgment of human rights
issues in light of potential safety concerns. 26
Multani can provide valuable lessons for other countries struggling with the
issue of religious garb in public schools. Because schools serve as microcosms
of the real world community for school-aged children, school cases and
controversies provide insight on the state of a constitution.127 As one scholar
noted, "[S]chools will be one of the institutions that tell us what
multiculturalism means as students, parents, communities and administrators
come together in an educational context."'
128
Canada can rely on Multani as evidence of a commitment to protection of
religious freedoms, but no such precedent exists in the United States. While
historical and political differences in U.S. and Canadian conceptions of the
church-state division exist, both countries aim to maintain a secular society
while recognizing religious plurality.'29 Further, scholars acknowledge strong
similarities between U.S. and Canadian court decisions on religious freedoms
despite differences in the relevant legal texts, historical foundations, and social
constructs of two countries. 30 Both U.S. and Canadian case law on religious
broader concerns with public safety highlighted in the wake of September 11); Smith, supra note
28, at 109.
125 Horwitz, supra note 51, at 7 (referencing S.C.C.'s Videoflicks decision and arguing that
what might be a binding religious tenet to one might appear to be the basis of a fraudulent claim
to another). A similar issue stemming from lack of familiarity with kirpans might involve
classifying the kirpan as a weapon rather than a religious symbol. See Brief of Appellants, supra
note 33, at 22 (raising this "linguistic" point in attacking the defendants' position). Whether the
kirpan could be classified as a weapon was also an issue in Peel Board of Education. See Sarah
V. Wayland, Religious Expression in Public Schools: Kirpans in Canada, Hiab in France, 20
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 545,548 (1997). Still, others will likely continue to classify the kirpan
as a weapon. See HAMILTON, supra note 15, at 116 (arguing "[k]nives are knives, and children
are not safe in their presence, no matter who they are" in reference to Cheema).
126 Smith, supra note 28, at 111.
127 Praagh, supra note 11, at 1345-46.
128 Id. at 1394.
29 Id. at 1388. For example, Praagh notes "[b]oth Courts seem to suggest, the children of
a society truly dedicated to diversity and tolerance can belong, subject to certain limitations, both
to particular religious communities and to the state-based society in which they live and learn."
Id. at 1390.
130 Eisgruber & Zeisberg, supra note 55, at 254-55. One of the most significant differences
in religious freedom jurisprudence is constitutional decisions on public funding for religious
education. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the government could not provide funding to private religious schools. Id. at 255.
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freedom can be categorized as involving either limitations on the government's
ability to limit the practices of religious minorities, or limitations on the
endorsement or promotion ofreligious activities.' Further, the countries' free
exercise case law focuses on equality and striking a balance between
accommodating state interests and religious freedoms.' As such, the
Canadian treatment of kirpan cases, particularly Multani, is worthy of
consideration in the United States.
133
Multani provides three important lessons for U.S. jurisprudence, which can
be summarized as: (1) the importance of compromise, (2) the functioning of
the school as a teaching and learning environment, and (3) the need for
guidance among schools and districts. Canadian scholars applaud the S.C.C.
for taking a stand on the kirpan issue that acknowledges both safety concerns
stemming from a kirpan's presence in a school and the rights of religious
minorities. 34 Thus, the Court's imposition of restrictions, such as requiring
the kirpan be sheathed and sewn into clothing, can be viewed as a strength, in
that it highlights the importance of compromise and accommodation.
135
Compromise and accommodation require schools to relax zero tolerance
policies and students to make concessions in the interest of safety while on
school property.'36  These concepts are extremely beneficial since
accommodation in the public schools "promote[s] toleration and respect for
diversity."'
137
131 Id. at 259-60.
132 Id. at 260 (recognizing similarities in courts' results despite the fact that the U.S. Free
Exercise Clause is couched in absolute terms while the Charter rights can be limited).
133 See Bhachu, supra note 15, at 218-22 (pointing out similarities in free exercise analysis
and freedom of religion claims in U.S. and Canadian courts and arguing for a consideration of
Canadian cases regarding kirpans in the United States); see also Horwitz, supra note 51, at
15-16 (noting Canadian and American courts have come to similar conclusions on freedom of
religion issues despite more U.S. cases and history on the subject). Though scholars commonly
point to the similarities between the countries' respective approaches to freedom of religion
issues, as previously noted, the separation of church and state issue stands as a major point of
divergence. Also, the Charter imposes a greater duty on the government to take steps to meet
the needs of minority religion practitioners, rather than merely setting forth a neutral
governmental approach. BARNETr, supra note 5, at 7. Barnett's article contains an insightful
summary of the permissibility of public expression of religious symbols in other countries. Id.
at 13-35.
"' Laidlaw, supra note 31; BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 5.
... Laidlaw, supra note 31; Clarke supra note 11, at 373.
136 Clarke, supra note 11, at 374.
' Id. at 373; see also Chandler, supra note 50, at 33 (suggesting "Canadian citizens and
educators should take pride in the fact that our highest court recognized our inherent respect and
tolerance for others' customs and beliefs").
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One reason schools are prime forums for promoting tolerance, as noted by
the Multani court, is the significant role educators play in developing tolerance
for diversity.'38 Scholars agree with one Canadian education professor who
suggested that the school board should have used the latest kirpan incident to
teach students about Sikhism, kirpans, and tolerance.'39 Educators will have
to brainstorm creative ways to teach students about the tensions between
religious freedom and larger societal concerns. 140 However, Canadian schools
have a number of tools to teach students the lessons of diversity and human
rights. For example, Quebec's human rights commission offers workshops to
schools on global citizenship and interculturalism. 4' Additionally, textbooks
and other course materials can transform the learning environment. One
Canadian textbook company has recently updated a civics textbook to include
a reference to S.C.C.'s Multani decision. 42 An online excerpt shows the text
asks students to think critically about the case, consider the values the S.C.C.
is upholding, and to consider whether Canada should adopt a law similar to the
French headscarf ban. 143
VI. IMPORTING CANADIAN LESSONS ON RELIGIOUS GARB ISSUES
The Oklahoma headscarf issue of 2003-2004 may be an indication of the
U.S. government's stance on the permissibility of religious symbols in public
school settings.'" Nashala Hearn, a Muslim sixth grader from Muskogee,
Oklahoma, was suspended on September 11, 2003, for eight days when her
3' Carter & Langan, supra note 10, at 8 (describing the court's discussion of educators' role
as dictum).
139 Laidlaw, supra note 31.
140 Clarke, supra note 11, at 375 (arguing that schools are important for teaching skills, civic
virtue, and citizenship).
141 Smith, supra note 28, at 110-11.
142 Emond Montgomery Publications, Book Catalogue: Canada in the Contemporary World,
http://www.emp.ca/index.php?option=com-hotproperty&task=view&id=350&Itemid=59 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2007); JOHN RUYPERS ET AL., CANADA IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 51-69
(2006), available at http://www.emp.ca/downloads/224-4_ccw_03_eval.pdf(last visited Aug.
19, 2007).
143 RUYPERS ET AL., supra note 142, at 57. Carter and Langan suggest an additional lesson
in noting that Multani provides needed guidance to administrative tribunals trying to determine
their role in protecting rights and freedoms under the Charter. Carter & Langan, supra note 10,
at 8.
'" Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement Agreement with
Oklahoma School District in Muslim Student Headscarf Case (May 19, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04-crt-343.htm; Davis, supra note 1, at 228.
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principal asked her to remove her headcovering and she refused. 45  The
superintendent of the school district maintained that the dress code, prohibiting
any type of headgear, was an issue of safety. 146 The U.S. Department of
Justice filed a complaint on behalf of the student arguing that the headscarf ban
was unconstitutional. 147 The student's attorney remarked "school districts that
pay lip service to pluralism and diversity but send a message of exclusion to
religious adherents whose faith imposes certain dress requirements repudiate
those same values in practice."4 The incident was resolved upon the parties'
settlement which required the school district to amend its policies to permit
wearing religiously required headcoverings, publicize the new policy among
parents, and implement a training program for educators on the policy. 149
Even though the U.S. government and public opinion have expressed heavy
criticism of the French headscarf ban, Derek H. Davis has commented that
"American law on the headscarf issue might not be as far removed from the
new French approach as most Americans think," particularly considering the
state of the free exercise jurisprudence. 5 It is still largely uncertain how a
U.S. court might consider a headscarf or kirpan issue, considering the impact
of Smith and Flores.'5' As Davis notes, "Smith is still on the books, and public
schools that wish to enforce their dress codes, provided they are not written
' Marianne D. Hurst, Oklahoma District, Muslim Student Dispute Headscarf, EDUC. WK.,
Oct. 22, 2003, at 3. Hearn wore headcoverings to school from August 18, 2003 to September
10, 2003 without incident despite the principal's knowledge. See United States' Memorandum
of Law in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Hearn v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist. 020, No. CIV 03-598-S
(E.D. Okla. 2004).
146 Hurst, supra note 145, at 3. The United States' Memorandum of Law lists a number of
instances where the school district made exceptions to the dress code policy banning
headcoverings including cases where a student suffers from medical problems such as hair loss
and special events like allowing hats in honor of Dr. Seuss's birthday. United States'
Memorandum of Law, supra note 145, at 3. Other reasons offered for policy include preserving
discipline and maintaining the school's status as a "religion free zone." Id. at 2-3.
' US Opposes Oklahoma HeadscarfBan, BBCNEwS, Mar. 31,2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/3585377.stm; BARNETr, supra note 5, at 15.
14' Davis, supra note 1, at 229.
"49 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 144.
0 Davis, supra note 1, at 222 (observing Americans have called the French ban "a fresh
outbreak of religious intolerance").
151 Further, many of the religious symbol cases have ended in compromises between the
school districts and the impacted students and their parents. Id. at 229. While the compromises
are positive, the lack of specific precedent leaves the status of the law unclear. Id. at 230.
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with the aim of infringing religious practices, can at least arguably rely on the
Smith standard."' 2
Despite the unlikelihood of immediate treatment of kirpans and other
religious garb issues by U.S. courts, steps should be taken to put forward a
nationwide stance that recognizes the need to accommodate religious
minorities' beliefs in school settings. First, more states should adopt their own
versions of RFRA that extend full protections for wearing kirpans and other
religious garb. Second, school districts should aggressively amend their
policies to grant exceptions for religious dress needs. Third, school districts
should look for opportunities to educate students and their parents about
religious garb issues. Finally, the U.S. Department of Education should issue
an updated advisory opinion and guidelines addressing religious garb in
schools. While Davis's editorial mentions the fact that a number of states have
passed RFRAs after Flores and notes the importance of the 1998 U.S.
Department of Education guidelines for protecting student free exercise, the
United States must do more than rely on dated guidelines and hope for a "move
beyond an abstract adherence" to the First Amendment.'53
State RFRAs provide a means of ensuring that state and local governments
do not burden religious exercise without using the least restrictive means to
achieve a compelling interest. 54 State RFRAs have been passed in direct
response to Flores as a means of achieving broader protection of free religious
exercise.' States adopting such measures include Arizona and Oklahoma,
152 Id. at 232 (discussing student dress codes and potential denial of students' right to wear
religious symbols and clothing). While it is unlikely that the U.S. government would be within
constitutional bounds if the legislature were to pass a law like the French headscarf ban, there
may be opportunities for more subtle forms of discrimination. See id. at 232-33. See also
Yuskaev & Weiner, supra note 2 (retorting "[s]o far, thanks to God, karma and Constitution,
nobody has proposed an outright ban on religious head gear on this side of the Atlantic," and
positing that "interfaith education and cooperation" is needed to balance religious freedoms and
the secular state). Also relevant is the different treatment of teachers with regard to religious
garb. State laws limiting teachers' ability to wear religious garb while performing teaching
duties have often been upheld. Gey, supra note 109, at 18-19.
153 See Davis, supra note 1, at 235.
' Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. &
RELIGION 187, 203 (2001). For a treatment of issues surrounding state RFRAs including their
enforcement, see articles in Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 513 (1999).
"' Berg, supra note 154, at 203. Alternatively, other states interpret their state constitutions
in a manner that rejects Smith. See Douglas Laycock, Church and State in The United States:
Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 537
(2006). For a list of states with RFRAs or similar policies see James A. Hanson, Missouri's
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and have patterned their legislative acts on the federal RFRA. 156 As a starting
point, more states should consider enacting RFRAs to fill the gap created by
the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of the federal version as applied to the
states.'57 Doing so is particularly important given that the validity of Cheema
is in question after Flores.'58
However, a state RFRA alone may not protect students desiring to wear
their kirpans to school. For example, Missouri's RFRA created an exemption
allowing the state to regulate weapons including ceremonial kirpans for safety
reasons.'59 The exception stemmed directly from Cheema and concerns with
post-September 11 school shootings. 6 ° Thus, state RFRA provisions should
"mak[e] it clear that religious freedom provisions should be available for the
full range of religiously motivated conduct, whether or not it is compulsory or
central to a larger system of religious belief."'' Otherwise, a student's right
to wear a kirpan or other religious garb could still be in jeopardy even with the
existence of a state RFRA.
Further, U.S. school districts should consider taking proactive steps to
address free exercise issues such as revising their dress code policies to create
religious garb exceptions. 162 Problematic dress code provisions will likely go
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A New Approach to the Cause of Conscience, 69 Mo. L.
REv. 853, 862 & n.53 (2004).
156 Hanson, supra note 155, at 862 & n.53. According to a 2003 count, twelve states had
formally passed RFRAs and seven more states had court precedent reflecting a higher
"compelling interest" standard. See Home School Legal Defense Association, Frequently Asked
Questions: State Religious Freedom Acts, http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/000000/00000083.
asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
157 Home School Legal Defense Association, supra note 156.
's See United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (suggesting Cheema was
at least partially overruled by Flores). But see Frank Sutherland, Current Issues Regarding
Religious Expression in the Schools 11, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.lathropclark.com/contentp
ublications/schoollaw/FifthAnnual/FCS_2005.pdf (suggesting that Cheema is still good law).
159 Hanson, supra note 155, at 890-91.
60 Id. at 891. Considering Missouri's reaction to Cheema, extensive federal government
endorsement of Multani might have the perverse effect oflimiting Sikh students' abilities to wear
kirpans to schools if states create RFRAs only to later carve out weapons exceptions.
161 W. Cole Durham, StateRFRAs andthe Scope ofFree Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 665, 722 (1999).
162 United States' Memorandum of Law, supra note 145, at 19 (citing Tulsa Public School
Dress Code which creates an exception for religious headcoverings). The appellant's brief
submitted in Cheema suggests that because kirpans often go unnoticed and have not created
school security problems, school districts have seen little need to address the kirpan issue. Brief
of Appellants, supra note 33, at 2.
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unchallenged until a student faces expulsion for a violation.' 63 As one scholar
notes, "a growing number of administrators now ask students to choose
between following their God and attending a public school."'" While the
optimal approach would involve proaction on the part of school districts, at the
very least, dress code policies should be changed to protect students' freedom
of religious expression by making accommodations for students who wear
religious garb.1
65
School districts' policies would only be strengthened by programs geared
toward educating students and parents about religious garb issues and the
districts' stances. Programs should be in place before an incident arises in
order to avoid singling out a particular student or controversy. 66 While U.S.
school districts can learn from reviewing Canadian practices and policies, there
are model examples at work already in the United States. The Kent School
District in Washington issued a list of multicultural activities that had taken
place during the school year including two information sessions about Sikhism
and the Five K's for students and families. 67 These efforts will reinforce
changes in dress codes by providing community education.
Further, the U.S. Department of Education should consider updating its
statement on religion and religious garb. As it stands, school districts, parents,
and students will have a difficult time unearthing the U.S. government's stance
on religious garb issues. The Department of Education's latest official
pronouncement on religion and schools was the 2003 Guidance on
Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary
163 See Haynes supra note 104; Letter from Josephine N. Moffett, supra note 121.
'* Haynes, supra note 104 (questioning why school districts are rejecting requests for
religion-based dress code exemptions).
65 See Michael J. Julka, Shana R. Lewis, & Richard F. Verstegen, Student Dress Codes, 4
PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP 57, 61 (2004).
"6 Laidlaw, supra note 31, at L09 (quoting Canadian professor, Michael Hoechsmann, on
the need to show sensitivity to the student and situation by not making him "the subject of its
next school assembly").
167 Letter from Kent School District to Principals (May 16,2006), http://www.kent.kl2.wa.us/
district/diversity/Multicultural Activities_2006.pdf. Unfortunately, Kent School District's board
policies do not appear to take Sikh students' special needs into account. The board policies on
student dress allow for clothing associated with religious observance but the extensive no
weapons policy prohibits any type of knives, objects used to intimidate, and school-related
objects used to injure. A Sikh student might be able to don a turban but not a kirpan unless the
district identified a kirpan as a non-weapon. KENT, WASHINGTON, KENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD POLICIES, STUDENT DRESS AND APPEARANCE #3224, POSSESSION OF WEAPONS AND
FIREARMS #3245, available at http://www.boarddocs.com/wa/ksdwa/Board.nsf/Public?OpenFr
ameSet (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
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Schools. 6 8 The public can reach archived information from previous
administrations through the Department of Education's website, including a
1998 press release declaring that "schools have the discretion to decide
whether students can wear religious garb such as yarmulkes and headscarves
to class."' 69 The 1998 Department of Education Guidelines on Religious
Expression in Public Schools report that students "generally have no federal
right to be exempted from religiously-neutral and generally applicable school
dress rules based on their religious beliefs or practices .. ."70 The 1998
Guidelines revisited the 1995 memorandum on religious expression in public
schools. 7 ' The earlier memo, noting that "nothing in the First Amendment
converts our public schools into religion-free zones," '72 remained in question
after Flores.'73 Thus, after the invalidation of RFRA, "schools may
accommodate students' religious requirements - but they may not have to do
,,174
so. . . .
The 1998 materials, while an accurate portrayal of the law on religious garb
in schools, are severely outdated and do not address socio-political events that
might make a stronger case for granting school districts broad discretion in
prohibiting religious garb for safety reasons. The issuance of updated
guidelines would not change the limitations imposed by Smith and Flores, but
instead would provide more direction for the school districts struggling to
handle an increasing number of religious garb issues and the constitutionality
of dress code provisions. 75 Additionally, updated guidance can provide a
forum for discussing Multani and similar litigation in the United States while
'68 U.S. Department of Education, Religion and Public Schools, http://www.ed.gov/policy/
gen/guid/religionandschools/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
69 Id.; Press Release, White House, The President Announces Release of Revised Religious
Guidelines for America's Public Schools (May 30, 1998), available at http://www.ed.gov/Press
Releases/05-1998/wh-0530.html.
70 Further, schools have a great deal of discretion in fashioning policies and regulations
related to student dress and uniform codes. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STUDENT
RELIGIOUS ExPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
GUIDELINES 129 (1998), available at http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/first/finding
commonground/B 10.USDeptGuidelines.pdf.
'7' Press Release, White House, supra note 169.
172 Davis, supra note 1, at 231.
'73 Id. at 232; see also Haynes, supra note 104 (observing that City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), required the revision of the Department's guidelines).
' Haynes, supra note 104 (emphasis added).
17' Further, there is evidence that school districts might be misapplying the guidelines. See
United States' Memorandum of Law, supra note 145, at 18 (criticizing the school district's
interpretation of the 1998 guidelines).
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encouraging school districts to be respectful of student religious beliefs and
practices.'76 Such encouragement, like former Secretary of Education Richard
Riley's call for schools to be "vigilant in protecting the right of all students to
express their religious faith in their own way," should not be buried in the
Department's archives.177
In addition to pursuing the above stated measures, U.S. citizens might
benefit from the subtle lesson of Multani-the importance of respect and
tolerance. In Tennessee, a county school board member expressed her
resentment of a board decision to allow a Muslim high school student to wear
her hijab: "I think it opens up a Pandora's box for us. You may have Jewish
students asking to wear yarmulkes and students from other religions making
requests." ' While Canadian provinces are not without racial, ethnic, and
cultural battles, Multani will likely continue to move the country toward
greater diversity and acceptance of differences.'79 As one scholar notes,
Multani shows the S.C.C.'s "willingness to go beyond the societal biased
opinions of the kirpan... to seek a compromise."' 0 While it might take many
years to change individual views, Multani exemplifies a government taking
steps to facilitate that process.
VII. CONCLUSION: LESSON LEARNED?
The United States, like Canada, prides itself on being a diverse and liberal
democracy."8' However, for many Americans, the choice between serving
one's god and attending public schools is real. 82 Cheema and other kirpan-
related school incidents only highlight the impact this choice can have on
children and families. It is Canada's history as a multicultural and tolerant
76 The guidelines were created to provide common ground on the issue of religious freedom
among educators, parents, and students. See id. at 18.
"I' Letter from Richard Riley, Secretary, Department of Education, to Principals (Dec. 17,
1999), available at http://www.ed.gov/inits/religionandschools/secletter.html.
17' Rhonda Thurman Says Allowing Islamic Head Scarf Was Wrong Decision, THE
CHATTANOOGAN.COM, Jan. 18,2005, http://www.chattanoogan.com/articles/article_61195.asp.
171 Operation Colour-Blind, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), June 10, 2006, at F4. According to a
recent poll, 37% of Canadians think wearing a veil is problematic, and 25% find wearing
religious items to be a problem. Kathleen Harris, Ditch Custom and Conform, LONDON FREE
PRESS (Can.), Jan. 18, 2007, at A3.
180 BUSSEY, supra note 31, at 5.
181 Praagh, supra note 11, at 1351.
182 See Haynes, supra note 104; see also Horwitz, supra note 51, at 2 (arguing that "the
religious believer in the modem liberal state is the servant of two masters").
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nation which prevented the Canadian kirpan controversies from creating the
sort of decade-long upheaval France experienced over the Muslim hijab . 83
The S.C.C. used the latest Canadian kirpan issue to voice the need for
tolerance, respect, and accommodation. Multani highlights the importance of
striking a reasoned balance between the competing interests of individual
freedom and state interests in the context of public schools, "crucibles of a vast
social experiment. 184  Without a strong pronouncement from the U.S.
Supreme Court, the resolution of religious garb issues in public schools
remains unpredictable. Out of this uncertainty comes an opportunity for other
branches of U.S. government, states, local school districts, and individuals to
take a stand. As a multicultural nation valuing diversity, the United States
would be well served to heed the lessons offered by Multani.
"83 Wayland, supra note 125, at 556. Wayland concludes that "Canada's commitment to
cultural and religious pluralism will prevent issues such as the wearing of religious attire in the
public schools from ever becoming as nationally divisive as they have in France." Id. at 560.
' Operation Colour-Blind, supra note 179.
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